Vol 68, No 10 (2024)

The article examines the priorities of China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific, examines the current trends of the US-Chinese strategic confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region, expressed, among other things, in the formation of new international institutions reflecting primarily the economic rivalry of regional leaders. The key features of the policy of the Chinese leadership led by Xi Jinping in the Pacific are highlighted. The course of the J. Biden administration’s Pacific diplomacy is compared in detail with the Indo-Pacifist policies pursued by previous American governments in the twenty-first century. The official regional strategies of China, the United States and American allies are compared, and the multivariance of U.S. partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries is assessed. The balance of positive consequences and risks in the relations between the United States and China with the countries of the region is analyzed, as well as the readiness of the East Asian states to follow in the wake of American and Chinese diplomacy. In this context, the potential and prospects of the subjectivity of the countries of the region in the context of the American-Chinese rivalry, their possible role as a stabilizer of political and economic processes in the Indo-Pacific are investigated.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly considered on the international agenda as one of the significant institutions for financing sustainable growth in the developing countries. In this article main activities of the four largest regional development banks are analyzed in the context of the reforms necessary to increase the financial capacity of MDBs. The need to reform the activities of multilateral development banks is due to both external and internal objective reasons. As regional development banks, all four banks discussed have the goal of promoting sustainable socio-economic development of the countries in their region, including poverty alleviation, as well as regional integration. The 21st century, accompanied by a polycrisis, poses new challenges for MDBs, to solve which it is necessary to increase their financial capabilities, as well as to change the credit policy and bank management system towards greater consideration of the interests of borrowing countries. A new social contract is needed between MDBs and developing countries that receive financial resources. The study shows that at the current stage, the practical activities of MDBs in implementing reforms are carried out mainly in the area of optimizing the capital structure and balance sheet and do not address fundamental problems. This can be explained by two objective factors: leading Western countries remain the largest shareholders of traditional development banks, which determines the vector of credit policy; the main source of funding for MDBs remains the world financial markets, which impose strict requirements on the level of investment profitability of attracted resources. In this situation, to fully address the problem of development finance, fundamental reforms in the activities of regional MDBs are needed, strengthening cooperation between them, creating coalitions with donors and intergovernmental funds, including between countries of the Global South, as well as joint efforts to promote the need to increase official development assistance (ODA) on various international platforms, including the G20 and COP.

The ambitious “green” industrial policy program promoted by the Biden administration is designed to consolidate the US claims to its leading role in shaping the global climate change agenda. The package of legislative acts approved by the White House provides for unprecedented allocations to address priorities for decarbonizing the American economy. Pumping up targeted manufacturing industries with federal subsidies and tax incentives has generally had a positive impact on economic growth, employment, labor productivity and innovation activity. After the adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), the process of transforming alternative energy into the fastest growing and relatively affordable source of electricity attractive for private investment accelerated. Large-scale investments of public and private funds in renewable energy sources, electric transp ort and batteries have stimulated the use of national resources. At the same time, the task set by the White House to achieve sole global leadership and weaken the dependence of national industry on supplies of raw materials, components and finished products from “unfriendly” countries still looks elusive. The most significant obstacle to meeting Washington’s overstated ambitions in terms of increasing the chances of American companies competing with China is the continuing lag in building up the production base of “green” energy. The US dependence on supplies of the “green triad” - solar panels, lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles remains high. Washington’s aggressive protectionist actions have failed to prevent Chinese companies from developing alternative energy sources, as well as the new energy vehicle industry (NEVs). The confrontation with China distracts the material resources of the United States from the tasks related to the implementation of the “new green deal”, creates obstacles to the scaling of “green” technologies. If the Biden administration or his successor as US president act even more aggressively, it will make it more difficult to achieve Washington’s climate goals, may involve some US allies in a “subsidy war” and may even serve as a trigger for a new escalation of international tensions.

The article explores nuances of strategic transformation of the American Arctic policy after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia’s Special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine has taken competition in the Arctic region to a new level. The paper introduces a new term “post-February” Arctic to describe the dramatic changes in the polar region after the beginning of the Ukrainian events on February 24, 2022. It shows that these events were almost unanimously perceived by Western analysts and public politicians as a “moment of strategic opportunity” to revise the international political situation in the Far North. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict critically changed the U.S. Arctic policy. The conceptual framework, within which the problems of “post-February” American polar policy are investigated, is the “offshore balancing” theory. The launch of the Russian SMO in Ukraine has led to strengthening the anti-Russian orientation of the U.S. Arctic policy. Facing a long military confrontation, Washington is trying to increase pressure in such areas critical to Russia as the Far North. However, the “post- February” U.S. Arctic policy is not so much the realization of political maximalism, but rather a reanimation and adjustment of Washington’s ambitions in accordance with the opportunities that emerged after February 24, 2022. The authors prove that despite loud calls to punish Russia for starting the Special military operation in Ukraine, the American response in this direction is restrained. The anti-Russian Arctic initiatives by various American public policy actors have a delayed rather than urgent effect. A quite moderate polar policy of the United States is explained by the fact that Washington is well aware of the limits of its capabilities in the Arctic. Its behavior throughout the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict illustrates the essence of the “offshore balancing” policy like nothing else.

The article examines the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union in the context of its developments at the supranational level of governance. Although the CFP is rarely scrutinized by political scientists, the policy has a considerable political dimension due to states’ sovereign interests in the seas, their connections to the social stability of coastal communities, and the escalating struggle over access to the overexploited marine bioresources. The political basis of the Common Fisheries Policy lies in the principle of relative stability which was established in the early stages of the policy development and represents a political compromise between member states regarding catch shares. The current institutional framework of the CFP results from a recent reform initiated in 2013, influenced by the Lisbon Treaty, and eventually entered into force in 2019. This reform finalized the introduction of the sustainable development agenda into policy, which changes the institutional balance and strengthens the role of supranational authorities. Hence, the Common Fisheries Policy may be characterized as a predominantly supranational policy. Brexit and the increasing importance of the external policy dimension underpin the role of the EU institutions. However, the Council has preserved the exclusive prerogative to set quantitative limits on catches, which prevents the complete communitarization of the policy. In this way, growing politization overlaps with the ever-increasing technical complexity of the CFP. The former stems from the European Parliament activism and the supranational demand for expertise from the industry and expert community. As a result, the Commission empowers subnational actors in order to gain an advantage vis-h-vis national authorities that pursue their own interests over the community ones. Also, the article reveals the functional spillover in action, especially as a result of supranational effort to reach sustainable catches, namely multiannual plans, landing obligation. It requires new policy instruments along with general oversight by the Commission.

The article examines the strategy of France and the EU in Central Asia (CA) aimed at strengthening economic (including trade and investment) positions, primarily in the key countries of the region (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) against the background of geopolitical turbulence. Based on strategic documents of the European Union, conclusions are drawn about the increasing importance of the Central Asian region for the EU, as well as about the evolution of EU-Central Asia relations towards a more institutionalised dialogue, which, in particular, is demonstrated by the adoption of the ‘Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia’ in 2023. Special attention is paid to the structure of trade and investment relations between the Central Asian states and the EU and France, the analysis of which also demonstrates an increasing mutual interest in cooperation. The article emphasizes the use of trade with Central Asia by the EU and France as a tool for diversifying imports of critical raw materials. The article also considers the directions of the investment strategy of European countries, mainly aimed at the development of transport corridors through the territory of Central Asian countries in the region as a whole and the strategy of French companies in Central Asia, especially in the energy sector. A growing interest in investing in the nuclear industry of Kazakhstan, the largest uranium producer in the world, against the backdrop of France’s declining influence in Africa, is highlighted. The authors explain Kazakhstan’s motivation in expanding cooperation in this area, which consists in the interest in obtaining French technologies for nuclear power plants. The activities of companies such as EDFand Orano, as well as TotalEnergies, which is developing renewable energy sources in the country, are cited as examples. France and the EU, by soft power and economic instruments strive to become a counterweight to the influence of Russia and China in the Region.

He article examines the ways the concept of a multipolar world is appealed to by politicians, diplomats, and international relations researchers in Mexico under the administration of Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador. A systematic analysis of Mexico’s foreign policy is used as a methodological basis, which allows to take into consideration global developments, the way the government shapes foreign policy, and the role of the president that influences this process, as well as material and normative factors. The instruments of discourse and content analysis are also applied in the research. The authors consider the features of addressing the semantic code of multipolarity among different groups of policy-makers and analyze the contexts and topics that are associated with it. The research concludes that, although the issue of the formation of a multipolar world is generally relevant for various groups of policy-makers in Mexico, the discourse on multipolarity cannot be considered dominant and lacks a specific strategy for the international positioning of the nation.

The article analyses the electoral participation of non-citizens of third countries residing in the member states of the European Union in the context of the integration p olicy of immigrants. The aim of the work is to assess the level of participation of non-citizens from third countries in municipal elections, depending on the degree of electoral inclusion in European states. Examples of countries with different systems of granting active voting rights to non-naturalised immigrants are Sweden, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg. In order to achieve this goal, a theoretical and conceptual basis for the study, built upon the theory of integration of immigrants through participation, was formulated, and the participation rate of non-citizens from third countries in the municipal legislatures of Sweden, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg was examined. Nowadays, in a number of European states, voting rights are an instrument of integration policy, as increased electoral opportunities for non-citizens of third countries in municipal elections encourage their inclusion in the host society. At the same time, by providing the opportunity to vote, governments have introduced additional implicit exclusion mechanisms that, in the context of discrimination, xenophobia and language problems, significantly reduce the participation of unnaturalized immigrants. As a result, three “ideal” types of access systems for non-naturalised immigrants from third countries to municipal elections have emerged within the European Union: exclusive, partially inclusive and inclusive. Among the countries surveyed, Sweden is one of the most inclusive, with the highest turnout of non-citizens from third countries. Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg have partially inclusive systems that imply institutional and symbolic barriers to participation. Participation in these countries is lower than in Sweden, and the more restrictive the system, the lower the participation rates. Thus, the voter turnout and degree of integration into the host society of the social group surveyed were lower in countries with a less inclusive electoral system. In states with varying degrees of electoral inclusion, non-citizens’ participation in elections has increased over time, but they continue to be inferior to naturalised immigrants and birthright citizens, while the acquisition of citizenship is a key tool for their integration into the political system of the recipient society. As such, voting rights cannot stimulate integration; a systemic integration policy, additional incentives for participation, information and advertising campaigns are needed.

Over the past 30 years, the world has achieved significant success in the fight against global poverty. However, progress in reducing its scale varies greatly in different parts of the world. Today, the epicenter of this calamity lies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The concentration of poverty in several places on the planet does not make the study of sources and dynamics of this phenomenon any less relevant. It is simultaneously both the root cause and the consequence of many current global challenges. The article focuses on analyzing the connection between the dynamics of poverty and structural shifts in the economies of developing countries. The authors note that for a long time, an important mechanism for reducing poverty in poor countries was the outflow of unskilled labor from the agricultural sector to the industrial one. As long as labor-intensive technologies were used in industry, it effectively absorbed the uneducated agricultural population, increasing their income and lifting them out of poverty. However, innovative labor-saving technologies and the digitization of economy have slowed down this process.Modern economy requires fewer workers while placing high demands on the quality ofhuman capital. Poor African countries, caught up amid global technological shifts, have faced major challenges. One of the main ones includes the low level of education and vocational training, as well as the absence of not only computer literacy but also basic literacy. Under such conditions, innovation cannot organically develop, create high-tech jobs, and contribute to poverty reduction. Our contribution to academic literature lies in the demonstration, based on empirical materials, of various models of reducing global poverty in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. We also draw attention to possible mechanisms of this reduction and their transformation against the backdrop of the implementation of modern advanced technologies.