Vol 68, No 3 (2024)

The unipolar global monetary and financial system (GMFS), formed after the collapse of the USSR, contrary to the expectations of the collective West, was unable to ensure financial stability and crisis-free development, since it does not consider the multipolar nature of the modern world economy and the strengthening of the positions of developing countries as regional monetary and financial centers. Intensifying confrontation between developed and developing countries is a real threat to continued existence of the current world order. The article proposes a gradual transformation and describes the future configuration of the existing GMFS, in which, along with traditional institutions, new ones will function, established on the initiative of the currently most influential group of countries represented by the G20, the comp osition of which should be expanded with new participants. The new configuration of the GMFS can be considered as a transitional structure that will allow participants in the world community to coordinate their positions, redistribute roles and master new tools of interaction. The world has entered an era of irreversible transformation, which should ultimately move it to a qualitatively new stage of development. There is an urgent need to formulate general rules for a new world order, which will be based on the principles of justice and multipolarity. However, humanity has a difficult road ahead until relevant agreements are reached. The sooner members of the world community accept the new reality, learn to listen and hear each other and begin a constructive dialogue, the faster and less painful this transition will be.

Economic security of the national state is traditionally considered to be implemented only at macro level of the national economy. However, a new reality of the XXI era has shown that the key aspects of the national security are being arisen at micro level of economic activity. Innovations have created not only new factors for prosperity but given birth to specific risks and novel threats for the national state. Digital ecosystems (DESs) that have just come to light have been generating a host of state threatening consequences. Nowadays most if not all of the largest world companies are parts of digital ecosystems. Market capitalization, total sales and total business operations of the digital ecosystems equal or even exceed the gross domestic product of many independent states. A typical profile of a digital ecosystem comprises such characteristics as self-regulation and independent business; vague industry and geographic frontiers; absence of clear inner structural elements within the firm; absence or minimization of material (brick-and-stone) assets. The services of the digital ecosystems lie in a variety of highly different production, transportation, market, and after-market spheres including finance and logistics. The intangible power of DESs is based on ICT technology, e. g., M2M and loT, which could work in an autonomous regime even off Wi-Fi areas. Cloud computing, fog computing and edge computing allow to storage and manipulate big data over the firms’ boundaries and stay off the government control. Although M2M interactions are good for telemedicine, industrial security, payment systems, etc., smart digital activity of DESs might be harmful for national economic security. Firstly, as digital ecosystems are collecting huge amount of private data, they have access to more subtle behavioral aspects of individuals than government offices. Using their private databases, DESs could influence clients in both economic and political areas. Secondly, digital cartels could implement brand-new types of price discrimination which are out of government regulations. Dynamic pricing in both sides of the digital platforms (for content providers and for consumers) could add to national inflation rates. Thirdly, information that is used to elaborate and implement government economic policy could be easily manipulated within DESs due to low quality of IT operators or because of hacker-driven misinformation. It means that the critically important statistics are in fact in the hands of the digital ecosystems, which have been transforming into tacit co-partners of government economic and social policy. In social sphere DESs have introduced a special business model, that is, worker-on-demand. Like video on demand or car sharing, employees can be hired temporarily with no labour contracts, no social security plans, no any feasible limitations on time, place, and conditions of work. Quantity of labour force, level of wages, and other important elements of working life are in the hands of algorithmic management, a special IT program elaborated by DESs’ specialists in the interests of the DESs. Such practices of labour market undermine the government social policy and increase social tensions. Digital ecosystems have changed labour resources in the direction of cyber wars. In order to defense their own infrastructure and virtual space of their activity, DESs are in the process of establishing their own cyber-army. The DES employees usually act as potential (and actual sometimes) cyber-worriers in detecting and eliminating unsanctioned penetration in digital nets of the company. The problems of digital ecosystems having too much economic power are being under consideration in many countries. For example, in China in 2021 the government replaced its former liberal IT policy for tight IT regulation of DESs. Thus, thinking about national economic security, we should take into account a new digital reality in forms of digital ecosystems and their desire (consciously or unconsciously) to substitute national state in its significant economic and social functions.

The article analyzes the main trends in the transformation of the political party system of the EuropeanUnion on the eve of the next European Parliament election, which will be held in June 2024. Long-term trendsinclude: a decrease in the popularity of traditional political parties - conservatives, social democrats and liberals - inmost EU member states; an increase in electoral support for populist parties in the same countries; an increase in therepresentation of women in EU authorities; strengthening the pan-European political space, which leads to deepenedimpact of EU political institutions on the political systems of EU member states, etc. Relatively new trends in thetransformation of this system are: growing popularity and influence of Eurosceptic parties both in individual Europeancountries and in the European Union as a whole; political conflict between the EU and its member states - Polandand Hungary which violate European democratic principles, including the rule of law with respect to the rights ofcitizens and the independence of the judicial branch of government. The author scrutinises the influence of changesin the socio-class structure of European society on these processes, which occur partly owing to a visible reductionin the number of the industrial proletariat. It is noted that the consequences of these changes are the destruction ofthe boundary between the traditional right and left parties, and the death of many classical ideological categories.The study also presents the forecast of results of the leading pan-European political parties' participation in the 2024European election, made by a number of European non-governmental organizations and mainstream media holdingsfollowing public opinion polls, as well as their possible impact on the formation of a new composition of the EuropeanParliament and the European Commission.

According to Ryan Griffiths, we’re in the “Age of Secession”. The characteristics of spatial effects typicalof Eupopean separatism are consistently examined in this paper. The effects of diffusion, proximity, fragmentation,and scale are given special consideration. The space is not homogeneous; separatism erupts with the most vulnerableterritories, takes different forms, and has different pace. Since the diffusion effect undoubtedly contributes to thefragmentation of the political space, it takes on distinct forms depending on the historical period. It would be incorrectto claim that separatist movements arise in response to geographic distance only. Social proximity determines spatialinfluence. Instead, the degree to which separatist actors interact with one another is determined by their territorialproximity. With scale of political activity changing, the correspondent extent, to which political actors influence them,varies as well. As a result, regionalist parties that are not well-known at the federal level play a significant role inlocal politics. Due to the fragmentation effect, the number of these parties is increasing at the regional level, yet notnationwide. Given the scale effect, regional actors in the EU can interact with supranational structures themselves andgain more power without having to go through national ones. There are more parties with a territorial profile as a resultof spatial effects in politics. Political leaders and parties at the national level are compelled to consider their stances,incorporate the regional agenda into their plans, and frequently pursue partnerships with them.

Immediate causes of Pakistan’s economy lagging behind the economies of neighboring countries,such as Bangladesh, India, and China, in the first quarter of the current century lie in a mixture of internal andexternal circumstances. Primarily, it is the state’s involvement in the “war on terror” that unfolded after the eventsof September 11, 2001, as well as exogenous natural shocks and financial policy with a built-in dependence onexternal sources of credit. The deep underlying factors of slower growth include the fundamental immutability ofthe social structure, the dominance of conservative capitalism, the seizure of the state by elites, which seek short-term enrichment, the transformation of Pakistan into a kind of “rentier state”. Nevertheless, the country has certainpotential for development. Firstly, a huge young population, which allows for the use of the so-called demographicdividend. Secondly, the state’s favorable geographical location that may help Pakistan to become a bridge betweenCentral and East Asia, on the one hand, and the Near and Middle East, on the other. This advantage has alreadybeen partially realized through the implementation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investmentproject. Thirdly, Pakistan’s natural resources are not sufficiently explored and deposits of not only oil, natural gas,and coal, but also metal ores and rare earth minerals can be discovered. In the middle term, Pakistan may embarkon the path of accelerating economic growth and become - among other achievements - one of Russia’s importantpartners in Asia.

Karnataka has become the first and only state in South India where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) hasever won Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) elections and come to power. Moreover, in four general elections from2004 to 2019, the party won a majority of the total of twenty-eight Karnataka’s parliamentary seats. Thus, the stateis known as a stronghold of the saffron party in South India, which has a rather significant impact on the nationalpolitical landscape and the balance of power in Delhi. The article examines ethnocultural, linguistic, socioeconomic,and political specifics of South India as a whole and covers the key moments and the main causes of the BJP’s rise inKarnataka. It also scrutinizes the party’s methods of social engineering. These include building of electorally successfulsocial coalitions, winning over dominant caste groups and local political leaders as well as political mobilizationbased on Hindutva, inter alia through disputes over sacred sites important for both Hindus and Muslims, campaignsagainst religious conversions, “hindutvatisation” of education, etc. Furthermore, the article examines whether and towhat extent these methods are effective in Karnataka and may be replicable in other southern states. The article alsoinvestigates the causes of the BJP’s defeat by the Indian National Congress in Karnataka Vidhan Sabha election in May2023. The author concludes that despite this failure the BJP has not completely lost the state as a springboard in SouthIndia, from where it plans to spread its influence to the rest of the region, and remains the majority party in the countryand the frontrunner in the general election to be held in 2024.

The locations of Fortune 500 corporate headquarters in U.S. cities spectacularly changed between 1970 and 2020. Previous researchers pointed on the diversity of business and financial services, agglomeration effects of the headquarters themselves and the role of airports as the leading factors in the localization of headquarters in the largest cities. However, factors that allow smaller agglomerations to also localize headquarters were also emphasized: proximity to the companies’ production facilities, the growth of passenger air connectivity, the opportunity to obtain more favorable local tax and regulatory conditions, more flexible cost of living for employees. Based on the Fortune 500 rating data, we analyzed the changing detailed geography of the headquarters locations of the largest American companies by MSAs by calculating the dynamics of the Shannon diversity index by economic sectors over the past 40 years. The share of headquarters of the largest corporations located in the top 50 MSAs has remained almost unchanged, but since 2000 the top 5 MSAs have been declining, while the share of MSAs in the second population quartile has increased. This trend towards deconcentration and the rise of second-order agglomerations contradicts S. Sassen’s hypothesis on the concentration of headquarters in several largest cities. The reasons for the deconcentration seem to be associated with the rise of new economic centers in the cities of the US South and West and the relocation of the headquarters of existing F-500 companies to this new centers, as well as the concentration of new industries in new places, not in the key centers of old industries. The economic diversity of headquarters has also undergone significant changes. If in 1980 the MSA New York was significantly ahead of all the others in terms of the number of headquarters and their diversity index, then by 2019 MSA Chicago was significantly closer to it in terms diversity index. At the same time, other agglomerations of Megalopolis (MSAs of Bridgeport, Richmond, Washington, etc.) of the Northeast of the United States, since 2000, have increased the diversity of headquarters, demonstrating independent growth dynamics despite the location in close proximity to the dominant MSA New York. They, as well as the fast-growing MSAs of Miami, Phoenix, San Jose, Denver, Raleigh and Winston-Salem, by 2019 showed the greatest industry diversification. Mono-specialization is not generally typical of large concentrations of headquarters, exceptions are the center of oil production, oil refining and chemical industry Houston, car manufacturing capital of Detroit and the center of Silicon Valley San Jose, the rapid growth of industrial diversity of which, however, did not allow reaching average diversity indicators.

The article makes a contribution to academic discussion about the actual global problem of providing world’spopulation with the food. The paper focuses on cooperation between Russia and China in the context of economicdevelopment of Russian border regions and food security in China which is both largest food producer and foodconsumer. The main research question is how the situation with the food security in China influences cooperationbetween Russia in China in agriculture production and trade (especially grain trade) and could Russia benefit from it.And otherwise, what makes it difficult to cope with China in this aspect: alarmist sentiments, bureaucratic troubles orlack of food in Russia itself. On the basis of the analysis of sources about Russian production, Chinese consumption andthe flow of goods via Russo-Chinese border the author concludes that import of Russian products (especially soybeans)has important but not crucial role for China’s food security while the demand for Russian production would maintainin the future. It is becoming more profitable for Russian agriculture business to produce food for Chinese marketin recent years so now large-scale Russian corporations displace small-scale Chinese farmers from the Russian FarEast soil but involvement of Chinese trade companies maintains crucial. There are good prospects for development ofagriculture in the eastern regions of Russian (not only Far East but Siberia as well) while increasing of export to Chinacould be provided only after the construction of special port terminal in the Russian Far East. Author proposes severalvariants for location of such a port terminal and analyzes actual situation in this sphere.

In March 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2virus has reached the stage of a pandemic. With over 700 million cases of the disease and close to 7 million deathsrecorded through May 2023 it turned out to have become the most disastrous pandemic after the Spanish flu of 1918-1919. It had a severe impact on all spheres of human life. In addition to having caused a huge stress of the public healthcare systems, it affected the functioning of the political and economic systems of all countries. This paper provides ananalysis of economic and political consequences of the pandemic, gives an overview of its human toll, and discussesthe unresolved issue of SARS-CoV-2 origin. The economic consequences of the pandemic, including reduction inGross Domestic Product (GDP), trade and travel, growth in unemployment rate, etc. were quite significant. Politicalaspects included the ability of the countries⁷ leadership to provide a justified, solid and well-coordinated response tothe threat as well as trust in the activities of a government on behalf of citizens. Not all politicians were able to meetthe high standards of performance in the emergency situation. Unwillingness of western countries to acknowledge theefficacy of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine is an example of political and economic controversies between states. Theprobability of the occurrence of similar pandemics in the future is rather high. Utilizing the lessons learned from theCOVID-19, scaling up the investments in the diseases surveillance and response systems, in hospital preparednessas well as in scientific research and vaccines development along with international cooperation, transparency andinformation sharing between countries on the above issues is crucial for facilitating the pandemic response in the futureand avoiding the challenges encountered during the COVID-19 crisis of 2020-2023.