Vol 68, No 1 (2024)

The paper considers long-term trends of global trade and there structural changes. We determine the elasticity of trade to GDP and the dynamics of the ratio of goods and services exports, as well as structural shifts in the major countries and regions of the world. The case study was focused on the USA–China trade relations and contradictions. Since 2007, PRC is the undisputed world’s largest exporter of goods. According to author’s estimates, in 2022 China was ahead of the United States in the total merchandise export by 1.5 trillion dollars. This corresponds to 6.3% of total world exports or 5.8% of US GDP. The trade war unleashed by former president D. Trump administration in 2018–2019 inevitably resulted in a decline in bilateral trade. However, this was just a temporary trend. The recent WTO statistics shows that US imports from China recovered by 2021 both in general volume and in the main categories of goods, both for intermediate and final consumption. Moreover, in 2022 its value, in particular for the analyzed commodity groups (aluminum, iron and steel) exceeded the indicators of 2017–2018. The author argues that, most importantly, there are long-term and fundamental implications of the trade conflict between the US and China rather than a transient decrease in mutual trade between the two flagships of globalization. In particular, it substantially exacerbated the protectionist biases in the international trade policies that became evident after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. It triggered appearance of new rapidly rising actors at the international trade field such as India and Brazil. This points at major underlying shifts in the global production and supplies schemes. Basically, tensions between the two flagships of globalization produced much higher uncertainty in the global trade which, in the next decade, is unlikely to show the dynamics comparable to that of the period 2002–2008.

In Ukraine, China continues to adhere to the policy of “neutrality benevolent towards Russia”, remaining “above the fray” and at the same time looking for its place in the conflict as a “mediator” that does not condemn Russia, but does not recognize the transfer of part of Ukrainian territories to Russia. However, in Chinese society and the expert community controlled by the Communist Party of China (CPC), the attitude towards the Ukrainian crisis is changing. If at the initial stage of Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, pro-Russian sentiments prevailed in the context of the Taiwan problem: “Russia is doing well!”, “And we need it!” Today, the angle is different: “neither for Russia, nor against”, with the addition that “the situation in Ukraine interferes with the normalization of China’s relations with the West and, above all, with the EU”. At the same time, Beijing is still interested in Russia as the main factor of “pressure on the United States” in the Sino-American confrontation. China’s two-tiered approach to Ukraine and Russia was manifested in Beijing’s reaction to the “Wagner” PMC mutiny. The official authorities limited themselves to a short statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry: “what happened is an internal affair of Russia”. At the same time, the situation around “Wagner” caused active discussions in Chinese social networks. Their main topics were the following: how stable the situation inside Russia is, how what happened can affect Sino-Russian relations, and the development of the SMO in Ukraine. In the past three months, Beijing has stepped up its foreign policy. High-level contacts were organized with the U.S. and the EU, conciliatory proposals were made to Japan and South Korea. However, this has not yet led to an improvement in relations, although, according to Beijing’s expectations, it may lay the foundations for normalization in the future. In other areas, progress was achieved where the PRC directed its financial resources – Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc. Relations deteriorated with those countries which improved their ties with the United States – India and the Philippines. Despite some personnel changes the internal political situation remains stable. Xi Jinping’ promotion as China’s “chief ideologue” in the “newera” continues. Without exception, all CPC members study Xi’s writings on “socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era” every day. At the end of June, Xi talked at a group study of the Party’s Central Committee members about “sinified Marxism”, the importance of combining “Marxism and Chinese civilization”. China’s main problems are in the area of the economy. According to foreign experts, China’s GDP growth rate is too low. Chinese analysts, on the contrary, believe that economic growth rates turned out to be moderately high compared to a low base in 2022. The PRC is starting to react more aggressively to U.S. sanctions. A set of laws has been formed that impose restrictions on foreign companies within China. At the same time, there is a belief in the country that foreign businesses interested in the Chinese market will themselves bypass U.S. restrictions.

The geopolitical and geostrategic position of Central Asia and, in particular, oil and gas reserves, the potential of transit and communication routes have led to a new round of interest of the leading world powers in the countries of the region. At the same time, for the People’s Republic of China, which is usually considered as the main “creditor” of the Central Asian countries, interaction with the states of the region in the field of security becomes a priority. This article identifies changes in the PRC’s approaches to ensuring security in the states of Central Asia by studying the rhetoric of officials representing the relevant Chinese departments, as well as taking into account the chronology of the signing of relevant agreements between the Chinese side and the countries of the region, establishing and changing interaction formats. In addition, the content and scope of China’s military and military-technical cooperation with the countries of Central Asia are analyzed from 2001 to 2023. Concerning the data presented, a conclusion is made about the main regional factors that influenced the evolution of the PRC’s policy in the region in the field of security. Based on the proposed logic of the work, the author identifies several stages of the PRC’s policy towards building interaction with the countries of Central Asia. At the initial stage of interaction, China’s policy in Central Asia was determined by the need to protect its own borders and limit the spread of the “three forces of evil” from Central Asia to Chinese territory. In 2009–2010 the PRC is becoming an important economic partner of the countries of Central Asia, and the basis for the goal setting of its security policy is the protection of its transport, energy, infrastructure (or generally economic) projects. In the future, most of these projects will be complemented and expanded as part of the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative in the region. Since 2019 the PRC has added to the format of interaction with the countries the component of bilateral anti-terrorist exercises, which it conducts under the auspices of its own campaign “Cooperation‑2019”. At the present stage, the interaction of the PRC with the Central Asian countries in the field of security is formed under the influence of the “China + Central Asia” format, where there are no external players like Russia or India and Pakistan.

Leadership as a phenomenon of timeless significance has always been a subject of research interest. It is a special form of social process inherent in all social groups. In this sense, it is characterized primarily by mutual influence of the members of these groups, with one or several of them exerting a disproportionally larger influence on the choices and actions of the other parts of group. At the same time, personal qualities including leadership style and political motivation remain the central concept of political leadership theory. The emergence of new challenges and new requirements for leaders makes it necessary to consider the tools of influence they possess and employ as well as their ability to adapt to the changing internal and external environment. This article focuses on the leaders of the Arab states who came to power in different periods and represented different types of leadership. In the times of national liberation movements, these were revolutionaries, who overthrew outmoded regimes, promised their people a bright future and built it in their own way. At present, the “redefining” leaders (mostly represented by Gulf monarchs) attract the most attention. They have proved to be highly sensitive to the demands of the time, offering their own ways of responding to them. Both monarchs and republican leaders sometimes share similar cultural and historical identities that influence their methods of governance. For example, the Bedouin theme, which emphasizes the ruler’s closeness to his people and his task to take care of his tribesmen, has been accentuated by the Gulf monarchs and by some revolutionary leaders. The author believes that leaders capable of “redefining” are not necessarily a product of democratic systems. In authoritarian regimes, a new generation of rulers has also contributed to the revision of a number of well-established dogmas concerning the goals of social and national development. However, methods, as well as certain management practices used in the Arab monarchies, have been shaped by a mix of elements associated both with modernity and traditionalism.

This paper contributes to a discussion on globalization and its prospects. Authors argue that the existing definition of globalization is, at least, incomplete as it focuses too much on macroeconomic aspects while ignoring the role played by international businesses in global trade and investments. Linking globalization with production and distribution decisions made by multination companies would alleviate ambiguity surrounding populist proclamations that globalization is over. Research argues that globalization is far from over because multinational companies are far from retreating from their global activities, but the nature of this activities is undergoing fundament changes in response to new technological trends. In the coming years services, data, rise of production robots will change the way global trade and investments are done and thus, will change how globalization is viewed at. Geopolitical developments challenge Russia’s participation in globalization, and the country has to seek answers for how position itself in the world economy. This search is complicated by the fact that in the previous 30 years a lot of efforts has been spent on the so-called integration into the world economy that has resulted in an excessive dependence of parts of the national economy on foreign markets. New sources of economic growth need to be uncovered. Authors suggest that rather then retreating from the global scene, Russia needs to refocus its efforts away from external trade for the sake of external trade towards an active participation in global economic governance and propose its own vision on how to face the new global trends.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the European Union development as an integration association. The economic aspects of integration within the EU as a whole as well as developing sub-integration processes are highlighted. Existing estimates show fluctuation in the level of the EU integration and its significant reduction in certain areas during some periods. The internationalization of the world economy and the increasing involvement of the EU in these processes couldn’t but have an impact on the intra-European situation. The assessment of the economic integration is made on the basis of the dynamics of the trade-investment cooperation and migration processes also. The analysis showed that different economic ties are not equally involved in the integration within the EU. If at the beginning of the XXI century the merchandise trade and FDI were comparable in terms of the level of involvement in the intra-European flows, then at present investment ties are considerably inferior to trade ones, having refocused on countries outside the EU. There is a steady trend in increasing of the share of citizens of non-EU countries living in the EU as well as EU citizens born in non-EU countries. The complexity of the European integration is traced by the example of sub-integration processes in the Visegrad Group. It is shown that accession to the EU has stimulated trade-investment cooperation within the “fourth”, but strong contrasts between members continue to persist. One of the main factors of the participation level in sub-integration is the economy size. Due to national features investment ties in terms of outstock are involved in subintegration processes more than trade ones. Sub-integration will continue to develop in the EU due to long-term factors, “complicating” pan-European integration processes, the non-linearity of which will remain.

The article analyzes the factors influencing the nature of cooperation between Southeast Asian countries with the United States and the directions of its implementation in the context of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China, who seek to influence them. The US interest in the region is primarily determined by the tasks of containing China and strengthening its position in the Indo-Pacific region by expanding ties with partners and allies. The approach of the Southeast Asian countries towards cooperation with the United States is motivated by two considerations – strategic and economic. In the context of growing concerns about China’s expansion in the region and the persisting territorial disputes with it in the South China Sea, the United States in the eyes of these states is considered a stabilizing factor of the regional security system. The article points out that despite the fact that the Southeast Asian countries are interested in the presence of the United States in the region, the anti-Chinese orientation of American policy limits the potential of their strategic interaction. Case studies of individual Southeast Asian countries confirm their commitment to the principle of inclusiveness in foreign policy, which excludes choosing one party over the other. Despite the fears inherent in Southeast Asian countries about the expansion of China’s influence, they prefer to pursue a hedging policy, which in reality manifests itself in the desire to balance between competing parties in order to neutralize risks and preserve strategic autonomy. This explains the dualism of the Southeast Asian countries’ policies and affects their cooperation with the United States in the field of security, which, despite the intensification of diplomatic activities of Biden’s administration and the conclusion of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, is developing slowly, except for the ongoing joint military exercises and arms purchases. In general, the Southeast Asian countries are – and contribute to – solving problems they consider important, primarily in the field of economy. Contrary to the prevailing idea of China’s economic dominance in the region, the economic relations of the Southeast Asian countries with the United States have been stable for a decade, developing in an upward direction, and beneficial for the Southeast Asian countries themselves. Economic cooperation remains a priority of their interaction with the United States, despite the importance of developing security relations. Pragmatism and the acknowledgement of the emerging geopolitical situation in the region determines the parameters of interaction between the Southeast Asian countries and the United States.

In the world (but not yet in Russia specifically) there is already an extensive and rapidly growing amount of literature on the role and place of emotions both in international relations (IR) and in the foreign policy of states. This gives grounds to talk about the “emotional turn” within the framework of IR as a research discipline. But it is also well known that emotions are studied not only by IR, but in psychology, in various areas of neuroscience and in sociology as well. This article deals with some ontological and epistemological issues, arising from the results of multidirectional efforts of many academics to conceptualize the international political role of emotions on the basis of the leading international relations theories. The immediate goal is the exploration in the chosen subject area of the methodological problem of the integration of social science knowledge with achievements from the field of natural sciences. It is proposed to pay particularly close attention in this sense to the paradigm of affective neuroscience. The phenomenon of emotion, in principle, does not fit well with categories, which until now the IR has been focused on. Methodological imperatives of objective research push for the exclusion of subjective emotional experience from the scope of consideration. Constructivists, in their turn, treat emotion as a cognitive belief rather than as a bodily state. But in the article, the emotion is represented as a phenomenon which is both mental and physical. This is a monist view, going back to Spinoza. The research leads to the conclusion that, although social constructivism has good potential for studying the emotions in IR, when intentionally ignoring the biological nature of emotions, social constructivists can weaken their own position in comparison with those academic opponents, who are committed to instrumental rationalism in their approach. Constructivists thus limit with no good reason their own agenda when studying emotions and hinder the development of a transdisciplinary approach to the study of emotions in IR in particular.

Review of a book: A leader against the backdrop of an era. Traditions and innovations of modern political leadership in Western countries: a monograph. Ed. by L.S. OKUNEVA. Moscow, MGIMO-University, 2022. 660 p. (In Russ.)