Vol 69, No 9 (2025)

The article examines the main trends in the changing structure of official reserve assets. For more than half a century the US dollar has been the dominant reserve currency in most countries. The dollar’s reserve currency status has been based on its global use for trade invoicing, cross-border investment and exchange rate anchoring. The dollar’s dominance was also supported by the US status as a global power, one that helps to guarantee the security of its allies. But, since the beginning of this century, two important trends can be noted: a significant increase in the total volume of global reserve assets and a decrease in the dollar’s share in them. Many central banks, especially holders of excessive reserve assets, have taken the path of diversifying their foreign exchange reserves, increasing the share of nontraditional reserve currencies and gold, and reducing dependence on the dollar. The dominant role of the dollar is also under pressure from the policies pursued by issuers of competing currencies in order to strengthen their international role, primarily by the eU and China. A potential threat to the dollar’s dominance may be the development by many countries of the central bank digital currencies, which are expected to be used in cross-border transactions. The trend of de-dollarization of reserve assets is promoted by the US itself, which actively uses the policy of sanctions to achieve its foreign policy goals, which undermines confidence in the dollar. Rising geopolitical tensions could trigger strategic adjustments in the structure of foreign exchange reserves.

In the current geoeconomic situation BRICS countries financial cooperation has become very significant. The article reviews the strategic goals of such cooperation, mechanisms of interaction, practical results and existing obstacles and challenges. BRICS countries financial cooperation is considered as a set of measures at multilateral and bilateral levels. The aim of these measures is to provide financial resources for sustainable development, including economic, environmental and social aspects; to reform international monetary and financial system in order to increase the role of Global South countries, including the creation of an independent financial infrastructure; to stimulate the use of new financial technologies and instruments; to support financial stability and to ensure financial security and sovereignty. Authors’ analysis discovered that the number of financial track initiatives has increased for the recent years, however in many cases they still remain at the discussion level and the exchange of best practices. BRICS Crossborder Payments Initiative (BCPI) aimed to establish payment system on the basis of central bank digital currencies, which was put forward in 2024 by Russia during its chairmanship in BRICS, was approved by the summit participants. However, the implementation of this Initiative is on a voluntary basis. Taking into account the different level of interest in its realization by BRICS countries and different level of their financial systems development, we can conclude that it will be difficult and time-consuming process. All this allows us to presume that the discussion will continue in 2025 and later. The practice of using national currencies in settlements between BRICS countries is expanding, but it also suffers certain difficulties. The share of the US dollar, although decreasing, still remains significant. And this is caused by the fact that the US dollar continues to be a liquid and comfortable means of payment, based on the highly developed American financial market. The research shows that the interbank cooperation has a number of positive practical results, particularly the increase of lending to member countries. It became possible with the assistance of New Development Bank (NDB). Credit transactions are predominantly bilateral, where one of the parties is either the NDB or China. BRICS countries face a number of challenges caused by existing differences and disagreements on a number of questions concerning financial cooperation. In this situation, the biggest results can be achieved in areas related to consensus goals, i.e. cooperation in sustainable financing, including climate finance, the development of new financial technologies, and ensuring cyber-security in the financial sector. To overcome the existing challenges and make a step to an effectively operating trans-regional organization, the BRICS countries need to demonstrate a willingness to reach a compromise in implementation of mutually beneficial solutions. This could help to provide further rise of BRICS countries’ role in the transformation of the international monetary and financial system.

The article provides an in-depth analysis of the evolving practices of collaboration between U.S. government agencies and private high-tech companies in the context of national security. It highlights the increasing institutionalization and strategic significance of public-private partnerships as a response to both accelerating technological change and intensifying great-power competition. The study focuses on key organizational actors such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and the Central Intelligence Agency’s venture capital fund In-Q-Tel. It explores the various mechanisms through which the U.S. Department of Defense and other national security institutions engage with commercial enterprises - from traditional procurement contracts and research grants to fast-track innovation programs and dual-use venture capital initiatives. Special attention is given to how commercial innovation is integrated into defense-related technological development in critical domains such as artificial intelligence, big data analytics, cloud computing, microelectronics, and space technologies. The article underscores the role of both major technology corporations and small startups in advancing military capabilities and shaping the broader defense innovation ecosystem. Beyond institutional design and policy instruments, the article addresses significant challenges arising from this collaboration. These include issues of regulatory complexity, ownership and commercialization of intellectual property, ethical concerns associated with military applications of emerging technologies, as well as tensions stemming from differing organizational cultures, values, and operational timelines between government bodies and private firms. Furthermore, the paper reflects on the geopolitical ramifications of deeper public-private integration, particularly with respect to U.S. - China strategic rivalry and its impact on technology governance and investment flows.

An attempt is made in the article to systematize and follow the evolution of terminology used by the U.S. State Department for describing digital diplomacy, as well as clarifying the terms borrowed by the academic community later on. The methodology incorporates examination of State Department official documents, proceedings of Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Department of State IT strategic plans, policy addresses by secretaries of state and their undersecretaries for public diplomacy and public affairs, official informational materials, and data extracted from the Department’s digital platforms. The timeframe under investigation (1993-2023) can be divided into two periods. The first one is Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations characterized to a certain extent by inconsistent terminology and the use of two groups of terms for defining digitalization of diplomacy as such (“electronic diplomacy”) and for digitalization of public diplomacy (“new diplomacy”, “netdiplomacy”, and “public diplomacy 2.0”). The second period is from Barack Obama first administration until now when the two terms were coined: “digital diplomacy” to denote the use of technologies for diplomatic purposes, and “cyber diplomacy” to promote the U.S. interests in cyberspace. Cyber diplomacy achieved formal legal recognition through the 2021 Cyber Diplomacy Act, while digital diplomacy evolved from the Information Resource Management (IRM) Bureau’s strategic plans into the 2022-2026 Joint Strategic Plan of the State Department and USAID. The author also notes the trend for the new terms, such as “mobile diplomacy” and “data informed diplomacy”, to appear when new technologies are being introduced into diplomatic practice, and to disappear later from discourse. It is suggested that the term “AI diplomacy” in the State Department documents will be used in the foreseeable future. The analysis demonstrates that this lexical evolution mirrors both technological advancements and a paradigm shift in American digital diplomacy - transitioning from ad-hoc projects to comprehensive incorporation of digital instruments within foreign affairs.

Since 2018, Armenia’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has led to a deepening rift between Moscow and Yerevan and an almost complete breakdown in understanding between the two countries. However, given the dynamics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, it is clear that strategic challenges do not always align with political ones. Following its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in the Fall of 2020, Armenia has found itself in an exceptionally vulnerable and unstable position. Rebuilding its defense capabilities would be difficult even without the degradation of relations with its Russian ally. Post 2022, Russia had shifted nearly all its focus to the Western direction. The Special Military Operation in Ukraine has drained Moscow of its surplus of modern weaponry, which could hypothetically have been shared with Yerevan. In search of alternatives, Armenia turned to India and France. However, without direct support or solid military guarantees from Russia, the process of restoring Armenia’s defense capabilities has run into what is known as a “security dilemma”. Azerbaijan still maintains a significant military and technical superiority over Armenia and benefits from its alliance with Turkey. This, in theory, allows Baku to impose its preferred terms for resolving contested issues on a relatively weaker adversary, long before Armenia’s newly acquired arms could correct the existing imbalance. This paper explores the crisis of Armenia’s multi-vector foreign policy and attempts to draw a distinction between foreign policy causes and military-strategic consequences.

The article analyzes the tools used by the terrorist organization ISIS-Khorasan (banned in the Russian Federation) to conduct propaganda and recruitment activities on the Internet. This issue is particularly relevant due to the vigorous use of virtual space by terrorist and extremist organizations, which makes their activities more decentralized and increases security risks by complicating the work of special services aimed at countering the terrorist threat. A list of the most popular online platforms that are used for distributing extremist content is provided. The article focuses on the structure of ISIS-Khorasan media outlets and the nature of their interaction with the core of Islamic State (ISIS, banned in the Russian Federation) as well as other regional branches of this terrorist organization. The article provides an overview of the social networks that the group uses to recruit potential supporters. It assesses the group’s tactics and the overall impact of ISIS-Khorasan propaganda on the population of the Afghan-Pakistani region and Central Asian countries. Particular attention is paid to the expansion of the group’s activity far beyond its stronghold and area of influence, which effectively brings the status of ISIS-Khorasan to a new, transnational level. Particular attention is paid to the innovative tools used by ISIS-Khorasan for propaganda purposes, as well as for financing of its subversive activities. The article evaluates the results of ISIS-Khorasan media activities on a regional and global scale, assesses the degree of terrorist threat emanating from the group, and provides recommendations on how to counter its activities.

The article contains the analysis of China’s “green” strategy in practical dimension, formed on the basis of the “ecological civilization” concept of the early 2000s up until the beginning of the global crisis of the 2020s. The development stages of the state environmental policy within five-year plans, forms of the country’s participation in the global “green transition”, and the achieved results are considered. State regulation of the economy, political and social spheres in China is an effective tool for the consistent implementation of economic and political strategy. Five-year development plans include clearly defined goals in all areas, comprising environmental policy. The latter, on the one hand, was initially aimed at solving China’s main environmental problems that arose as a result of the rapid industrial development of recent decades, and on the other hand, is closely linked to the implementation of the global “green transition” strategy proposed by Western countries, which has become the political and economic mainstream throughout the world. The authority of the state power in China, as well as efficiency in implementing state development plans made it possible to achieve the planned results in each five-year period, and in some cases to exceed them. These economic achievements, including in the field of “green transition”, became a significant factor that predetermined the place of the PRC in the global economy and geopolitics. At the same time, the current geopolitical situation allowed China to oppose its “green” development model to the dominant Western model already by the beginning of the 2020s (although the environmental indicators achieved by that time were still far from perfect). The subsequent global crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic did not change, but only strengthened this trend, and the following geopolitical confrontation of the great powers enhanced the role of China as a world center of power.

The article is devoted to the political evolution of the Union of the Comoros, an island state whose strategic location imperatively and firmly involves it in the geopolitical processes in the Indian Ocean basin. A small country located on islands objectively gravitates toward centralization, but the desire to return the island of Mayotte, held by France, forced its political elites to turn to federalism after gaining independence. The simultaneous action of centrifugal and centripetal trends makes the Comorian federation a rather paradoxical phenomenon, contradictorily but inextricably combining the dispersion of power and centralizing practices. Throughout its short independent history, the Comoros repeatedly switched from centralization to decentralization and vice versa. At the same time, the declarative commitment to the federal ethos, repeatedly enshrined in national constitutions and intended, according to local elites, to leave the door open for Mayotte to return to the “motherland”, has stimulated - and will probably continue to stimulate - separatist impulses as a side effect. At the same time, even the unsuccessful attempts at secession undertaken in the 1990s and 2000s by the islands of Anjouan and Moh6li, which nearly destroyed the state, could not turn the Comorian leadership away from federalism. Despite all the costs, it is perceived by local politicians as the most rational choice. In terms of comparative federalist studies, the Comorian experience is interesting in that it allows us to question the established correlation between federalism and democracy, showing that federal principles can be effectively used by authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the Union of Comoros’ policy towards the island of Mayotte reveals an unconventional aspect of federalism: in this case, it serves as an instrument of counteraction to French neocolonialism.