Vol 69, No 3 (2025)

This article explores the interference discourse within the United Nations. Methodologically, the article proves that public rhetoric of states is representative with regard to their perception of interference. It also introduces a novel database on interference discourse based on speeches of national representatives at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) during the high-level week from 2004 to 2023. The debate at the United Nations reflects a persistent gap in concerns regarding foreign interference between the West and the rest of the organization. Its origin dates back to the 1970s, which witnessed the rise of a coalition of developing and socialist states seeking to strengthen the sovereignty norm in international relations and Western states striving to remove the issue from international agenda. The collapse of the socialist camp strengthened positions of the West. As a result, the UNGA abandoned previous practice of regularly adopting resolutions condemning interference. Nevertheless, a number of states preserved the issue on the agenda through their rhetoric in this body. They became especially vocal in the early 2010s after the wave of political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa which exemplified the role of external actors in fostering protest activities. Condemnation of interference at the United Nations comes primarily from the Middle Eastern and Latin American states, as well as Russia, North Korea and China. Sporadically, African governments also engage in it. Other developing states demonstrate less interest in the matter. The West remains reluctant to talk about interference. Despite attempts to manipulate the UN agenda, the organization remains instrumental for non- Western countries to condemn interventionism and undermining of state sovereignty. The use of systematic data on perceptions of interference helps identify like-minded partners interested in cooperation against this common challenge.

The article examines factors and problems of Russia’s access to non-CIS countries product markets (by the example of E7 countries). General factors including WTO membership, granting most-favored-nation treatment, providing market economy status and membership in integration blocs (or preferential trade agreements), are considered more or less favorable. Unlike unfriendly countries, in case of non-ClS countries there have been no fundamental changes in general factors after 2022 - no open discrimination against Russia takes place, but some problems exist. Factors of the first order that are directly related to foreign trade policy, are outlined. Tariff and non-tariff barriers for Russia’s access to E7 countries different groups of markets (agricultural products, fuels and mining products, high-technology products) are revealed, comparative analysis with G7 countries is conducted. Practice of liberalizing tariff measures in E7 countries is monitored, conclusion on its more frequent nature than in G7 counties is made. Problem of tariff peaks is outlined, which is more acute than in unfriendly countries. Different types of non-tariff barriers on E7 countries markets are revealed and calculated, including administrative, quantitative restrictions, trade remedies, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Features of these non-tariff barriers application in comparison to G7 countries are demonstrated. Intensity of non-tariff barriers against Russia (number of non-tariff barriers per one billion dollars of Russian exports to a particular country) for E7 countries is estimated, which is twice higher than for G7 countries. Factors of the second order related to other types of economic policy (besides foreign trade policy), including industrial policy, protection of the environment, are analyzed by the example of China. They are considered more favorable than in unfriendly countries, but cause certain concerns in the future. Possible ways to improve Russia’s access to non-CIS countries markets are suggested, including using WTO instruments. The most important way is considered acceleration in conclusion of preferential trade agreements, where Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union lag far behind non-CIS countries, especially unfriendly ones.

The article attempts to analyze new developments in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, significant changes have occurred in inter-Korean relations. The leadership of the DPRK has abandoned the goal of unification of Korea, stating that it will proceed from the realities of the existence of “two warring states” on the peninsula. The administration of Yun Sok-Yeol, for its part, continued to raise the issue of unification, promoting plans to increase influence for these purposes directly on the population of North Korea, bypassing the official authorities. The new Cold War that has gripped the Korean Peninsula after a brief period of detente in 2018-2019, and the subsequent move by the two Koreas to mutual nuclear deterrence, has long buried hopes for inter-Korean reconciliation, dialogue and cooperation. Instead of gradual rapprochement with subsequent integration into one state entity, the opposite process is now gaining momentum - dismantling and destruction of all the acquisitions and developments of past years: the contractual and legal framework, cooperation mechanisms, communication channels. It has been shown that the idea of Korean unification, a goal that was considered quite realistic in the past, is now turning into an utopia, an abstract slogan behind which there is no real program of action. Despite the obviousness of the task to establish relations of peaceful coexistence, including, of course, the resolution of the consequences of the Korean War, the DPRK and the ROK are still far from finding a reasonable formula for settlement that would allow the contradictions existing between them to be removed. In the current conditions, the general dynamics of the development of the situation will most likely remain quite high and saturated with conflict events. This is fraught with the emergence of new complications on the Korean Peninsula, making peace and security in this region vulnerable to challenges of a military, political and other nature.

Internal regional integration in Central Asia has been one of the most popular foreign policy directions of regional players since independence in 1991. The first attempt to deepen intraregional cooperation was made in the 90s of the last century. But due to internal contradictions, unwillingness to real integration, as well as due to the activation of the Russian Federation to restore political and economic ties with the region with the creation of the EurAsEC, the regional projects being developed were combined with the Russian initiative. The second stage of regional integration was launched in 2016 with the coming to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan. An annual high-level consultative format has begun, within the framework of which Central Asian leaders discuss topical issues on the regional agenda. At the same time, attempts to revive regional integration are taking place against the background of unprecedented activity of external players who offer their own forms of deepening intra-central Asian interaction, but with the involvement of a sixth player. At the same time, to date, as part of the implementation of the Russian initiatives of the EAEU and the CSTO, institutions and a regulatory framework have been formed, which, with some exceptions, have already become the main one for integration with the participation of other post-Soviet countries. In fact, without relying on this foundation, full-fledged regional integration of the Central Asian countries is impossible The article proposes to consider the factors contributing to integration in Central Asia, as well as to analyze the constraining aspects for an exclusive intraregional dialogue.

The agenda of the Union State in the modern conditions is enriched with the meanings and categories that have not been demanded by the political community before. Changes in the internal and especially external environment actualize the activation of patriotic rhetoric at different levels. Patriotism is increasingly recognized as a normative resource not only in the plane of intra-state interactions, but also in integrative ones. The Union State, being a multidimensional format, is objectively and subjectively perceived as a model platform for testing and implementing the idea of a common Motherland. This idea is supported by a whole set of traditional and modern ties, historical and moral values, a kind of elite pact. However, its content is ambiguous, as well as the understanding of the importance of the union patriotic agenda as a whole. This reasoning is illustrated by the results of the discursive practices analysis of allied institutions members and an expert survey with the participation of Russian and Belarusian specialists. The scale of assessments in this field is quite wide - from exclusively p ositive to negative. Optimistic judgments and p ositions prevail, oriented towards substantiating and developing recommendations for improving national mechanisms and technologies that correspond to the Union ones. For political community representatives of the Union State, the central issues are the preservation of historical memory, patriotic education of youth, creation of a common educational, informational and symbolic space, confrontation with external challenges and threats, and internal consolidation. The conjugation of axiological aspect and pragmatic expectations and needs is obvious. It is argued to stimulate the population loyalty of the participating countries, primarily young people, to the Union State, the idea of union building, a common Motherland through comprehensive activities, programs, projects covering different spheres, right up to scientific and technological. Experts, as well as representatives of the political community, note the multiplicity of factors contributing to the actualization of common approaches to patriotic education within the Union State. A distinctive feature is that they emphasize internal factors to a greater extent than national and union-level politicians. The jointly high evaluation is addressed to the regions of Russia and Belarus and their contribution to the formation and promotion of the patriotic agenda. Experts tend to criticize the role of union institutions as bureaucratic and, for the most part, do not support proposals to create new units or bodies responsible for patriotic education. The content and nature of political and expert assessments, as well as certain recent integration decisions, encourage to do conclusions about rather favorable prospects in the area under consideration. The key consistent lines of representation by the leading political actors of the patriotic theme projected on the union space have been formed, the introduction of relevant guidelines into the normative field and the main directions of the union construction has begun, and a huge number of patriotic initiatives are being implemented. At the same time, unsurpassed gaps in historical policy, identity policy, unresolved fundamental issues in the humanitarian dimension, conflicts in the interpretation of the state (national) ideology, refusal to deepen political integration, vague contours of the model of Russian-Belarusian integration and some other circumstances prevent the completion of institutionalization of the Union patriotic agenda and, to an even greater extent, the Union policy of patriotic education.

The article provides a detailed analysis of various aspects of India’s system of education, including school, higher and vocational education. The authors state that since independence, India’s economic visions have emphasized education as a key factor of the country’s development, and various Indian politicians sought to contribute to education of the Indian population. The paper studies the institutional framework, management and regulation features, quantitative and qualitative measures of the system, as well as its major achievements, noting in particular the significant improvement in the literacy rate of the Indian citizens, enrolment rates in schools and higher education institution, education coverage at different levels and the growing skills of the labour force. The emphasis is made on India’s strategic policy documents, particularly National Education Policy 2020, aimed at overcoming problems in the education sector. The authors point out that despite all positive developments, today India faces a wide range of challenges in the educational sphere. Specifically, the mean years of schooling is at a low level; a large number of schools lack appropriate infrastructural facilities, as well as qualified teachers; the average quality of education leaves much to be desired; discrepancy between labour supply and demand (regarding highly skilled labour force in particular) is very high due to outdated and inflexible education system. Besides, India has to cope with persistent regional, social, gender, religious and caste inequalities, in addition to funding shortages and inadequate regulation. The authors come to the conclusion that education will remain a key to India’s becoming one of the leading world powers. The South Asian giant has great development potential primarily due to vast human resources, but to leverage this demographic dividend it should address a number of significant shortcomings and overcome pressing social, regulatory, financial and infrastructural challenges that are still acute. Otherwise, the dividend may turn into a burden that will become an obstacle to India’s rise.

The Indian government does not pay enough attention to interacting with the communities of Indian immigrants located in Latin American and Caribbean States (LAC). This is related not only to the long history of Indian immigrants living in the region and their presumed assimilation into host societies, but also to their small numbers. Traditionally, the Indian government has sought to avoid contact with immigrant communities and their descendants in the Caribbean due to social and political tensions between the Indian and Creole populations of Guyana, Trinidad, and Suriname. Currently, the Indian government is working with the successful diaspora of developed countries rather than with the “plantation diaspora”, trying to avoid colonial period of Indian history.Moreover, Latin America and the Caribbean are not a priority direction of India’s foreign policy, despite the growth in trade and investments. The mentioned circumstances are reflected in the work of the Indian government with Indian communities in the region. However, immigrants who initially arrived in the Caribbean islands as labourers avoided Christianisation and complete assimilation into the dominant Creole culture. They have preserved their own identity, culture and religion, and continue to reproduce them in social, religious and cultural practices. The aim of the research is to prove that the communities of Indian immigrants in Latin American and Caribbean countries constitute an ethnocultural diaspora, as they are characterised by a) living in a different ethnocultural environment due to migration and dispersion; b) the mythologization of the image of their historical homeland and an emotional connection to it; c) the reproduction of their own ethnocultural identity. To achieve the stated goal, the authors employ structural-functional analysis, intersectional and constructivist approaches, as well as the concept of diaspora. At the same time, the authors try to avoid essentializing ethnocultural identity. The results of the research not only fill a gap in Russian studies of the Latin Caribbean region and Indian migration but also enable India to leverage the potential of its diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean to promote its own interests and develop p olitical, economic and cultural ties with the countries of the region.